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Abstract—In various scenarios, achieving security between
IoT devices is challenging since the devices may have different
dedicated communication standards, resource constraints as
well as various applications. In this article, we first provide
requirements and existing solutions for IoT security. We then
introduce a new reconfigurable security framework based on edge
computing, which utilizes a near-user edge device, i.e., security
agent, to simplify key management and offload the computational
costs of security algorithms at IoT devices. This framework is
designed to overcome the challenges including high computation
costs, low flexibility in key management, and low compatibility
in deploying new security algorithms in IoT, especially when
adopting advanced cryptographic primitives. We also provide
the design principles of the reconfigurable security framework,
the exemplary security protocols for anonymous authentication
and secure data access control, and the performance analysis
in terms of feasibility and usability. The reconfigurable security
framework paves a new way to strength IoT security by edge
computing.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Security, Edge Computing,
Authentication, Access Control
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the diverse types of consumer electronics, people’s
life has been changed dramatically. The devices are inter-
connected by diverse types of communication technologies to
the Internet, known as Internet of Things (IoT) to exchange
information. Nowadays, IoT devices are widely deployed
based on the existing standards for various applications such as
smart home, smart city, body networks, smart grid, vehicular
ad-hoc networks, and autonomous control systems. Many IoT
alliances and consortia, e.g., Alljoyn, IEEE P2413, IPSO, OCF,
OMA, etc., have proposed their own standard frameworks for
IoT among the developed standards. They attempt to manage
things, devices, the provided information, and their computing
ability as resources, which can be interconnected and utilized.
In this context, security is of the first priority to guarantee
the availability and functionality of IoT applications. Only
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basic security protections, i.e., authenticated key exchange and
access control, for the communications has been addressed in
IoT related standard frameworks.
The security mechanism for IoT should support heteroge-
neous types of devices and communication standards for ap-
plications, which leads to the requirements of comprehensive
security protections [1], such as anonymous protection and
fine-grained secure access control. Therefore, new security
framework is required, which can simplify deployment of se-
curity solutions and minimize the change of existing systems.
A. Security Issues in IoT related Applications
The applications of IoT can be categorized into the
following domains: Internet of transportation, Internet
of senor/controller, Internet of energy, and device-to-
device/machine-to-machine communications. Exemplary ap-
plications of these domains include vehicular ad-hoc net-
works (VANETs), smart home, and smart grid. The security
requirements of each application can be various according to
application scenarios. For instance, VANETs need to keep the
identity of each vehicle anonymously against location/session
traceability, the smart home needs to protect the identity
of each controller to conceal sensitive behaviors of each
individual, and the smart grid will need to conceal electricity
consumption against analysis in appliance usage. Besides the
specific security requirements of each IoT application, there
are generically challenging issues in guaranteeing security in
IoT as follows.
• Key management of cross-application is complicated as
each application may manage its security keys for specific
security purposes [2]. A user device engaged in multiple
applications needs to manage multiple security keys or
passwords. This will increase the risk of key disclosure
and endanger the security of services.
• Advanced cryptographic algorithms, e.g., group sig-
natures (GS) [3] for anonymous communications and
attribute-based encryption (ABE) for access control on
data, need to be performed on IoT resource-constrained
devices. This will make real-time IoT application failed
as the computation of the advanced algorithms cannot be
completed in a pre-defined period.
• Flexibility to support various security protections for di-
verse IoT applications with minimum changes on funda-
mentals, i.e., standard protocol, softwares, and hardwares,
is a significant factor to developers for usability.
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2Due to above issues, the challenges in satisfying IoT secu-
rity requirements1 include 1) the complexity of key manage-
ment for diverse application and data models, 2) the com-
putational infeasibility of resource-constrained IoT devices
for advanced cryptographic algorithms with high computation
complexity, 3) the inflexibility in supporting new security
functions due to independent design of each communication
standard and the layered architecture of networking.
B. Possibly Reconfigurable Solutions for IoT Security
For the security issues in IoT, the following existing solu-
tions can be considered.
1) AAA Framework and Extensible Authentication Proto-
col: Authentication, authorization, accounting (AAA)
framework supports security services for applications
such as mobile IP, network access service (NAS), and
session initiation protocol (SIP), in both local and roam-
ing scenarios.2 The EAP [4] is a standard authentication
framework to support the flexibility of various security
protocols based on AAA framework, widely used in
wireless networks. AAA and EAP offer certain flexi-
bility on key management and various security protec-
tions [5]. However, the issue of computation costs in
applying advanced algorithms still remains.
2) Access Control Techniques: The role-based access con-
trol (RBAC) has been widely used in software sys-
tems and applications for operating and managing re-
sources. The RBAC is originated by using the con-
cept of user/group to grant permissions to access files
in UNIX system [6]. The attribute-based access con-
trol (ABAC) [7], different from RBAC, provides a fine-
grained access control by controlling each access with
the given policies and the attributes of users. Those
access control techniques may offer the flexibility in
adopting various security measures by regarding each
security service as object.
3) Single Sign On Mechanism: The single sign on (SSO)
is an access control technique that makes a user logs
into multiple software systems using one account. Many
related standards have been proposed, such as the
lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) [8], Ker-
beros network authentication service [9], smart card
based authentication, and security assertion markup lan-
guage (SAML). In SSO, user account information is
stored in databases on authentication servers. For every
user accessing to a software system, the SSO-based au-
thentication involves the user, the authentication server,
and the target system. SSO is akin to access control
system and also facilitates the flexibility of providing
security services.
The above solutions allow certain flexibility to adopt com-
prehensive security measures and to control the access to
1The IoT security requirements can be divided into the two major cate-
gories, i.e., secure communication and data security.
2Remote authentication dial-in User Service (RADIUS) and Diameter are
two standard protocols adopting AAA frameworks, where the latter is the
newer standard but not fully backward compatible with RADIUS.
security services. However, the key management remains as
an issue since each device needs to maintain multiples security
keys or certificates for diverse applications/services. Moreover,
how to make the computation of advanced cryptographic
algorithms feasible on the resource-constrained devices is still
an issue. Hence, a framework for the requirements of IoT
security is essential, which will be introduced for the above
two issues in this article.
C. Reconfigurable Security with Edge Computing
The edge computing is a new computing model [10], where
a near-user device with stronger computing power provides
required resources for the applications of other resource-
limited IoT devices. Based on edge computing, the challenges
of high computation costs, low flexibility, and incompatibility,
in supporting security with advanced cryptography can be
relieved by the new framework below.
We introduce a new reconfigurable security framework
for IoT (ReSIoT) to overcome security challenges without
changing the architectures or re-designing the standard pro-
tocol flows of IoT applications. The framework utilizes a
new component, i.e., security agent (SA), which is a near
user-edge device such as wireless router, base station, service
router, etc. The computation capability of SA is generally
more powerful than most of resource-limited IoT devices
and it can be used to offload the overhead of cryptographic
computations at the resource-limited devices and centralized
computing infrastructure.
Through the reconfigurable security, each device involving
a security function (e.g., authentication, access control, etc.)
only needs to guarantee secure communication with the SA by
maintaining keys with SA. The SA generates and distributes
required security information with its security key, registered
to a global key management system (GKMS), to complete
corresponding security procedures between IoT devices. The
benefits of the introduced reconfigurable security for IoT can
be summarized as follows:
1) The key management can be simplified from application
level to user level in terms of IoT devices.
2) Due to stronger computation capability of SA, even the
low-end devices will be able to be protected by advanced
security algorithms requiring high computation costs.
3) Different from the previous concept of reconfigurable
security in 3G/4G networks [1], [11],3 the introduced
reconfigurable security for IoT does not require to
change system architectures of the original protocols
and standards, and also considers all possible security
requirements that can be fulfilled by cryptographic coun-
termeasures.
4) Compared to cloud-based solutions, exploiting near-user
edge devices for IoT security provides better scalability
and usability.
3The concept of reconfigurable security has also been proposed for 3G/4G
networks [1], [11] to resolve the security of 3G/4G interworking and roaming
mobile devices. However, these frameworks only address requirements of
secure communications, and also adopting the frameworks needs to change
original system architectures.
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Fig. 1. The system architecture and adversary model of IoT reconfigurable security.
5) Even cloud-based computing may also help to offload
computation overhead of security protection, users may
need to give their security keys to cloud servers, while
the reconfigurable security remains security keys con-
cealed by users.
This article gives light on the potential of reconfigurable secu-
rity as an essential security framework for IoT, and organized
as outlined below. In Section II, security requirements of IoT
is presented, and the potential security solutions and their
limitations are discussed in Section III. In Sections IV and V,
the system design and constructions of reconfigurable security
functions are provided, and their performances are evaluated
in Section VI.
II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF RESIOT
A. Security Architecture
Besides of the common security requirements of confiden-
tiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation, the ReSIoT
gives rise to additional security issues regarding the compu-
tation of security functions (SFs) on SAs for IoT devices.
The security requirements specially aim at two kinds of ad-
versaries, malicious IoT devices and honest-but-curious SAs,
as shown in Fig. 1. A malicious IoT device may misbehave
during the interactions with the other IoT devices. A honest-
but-curious SA may intercept the exchanged messages and
trace the communication footprints among IoT devices. Hence,
a reconfigurable security function (RSF) constructed by a
specific SF should fulfill the additional security requirements
as follows.
• Confidentiality against honest-but-curious SA: The
confidentiality of message exchanges between IoT de-
vices should be guaranteed even SA helps on computing
SFs involving the exchanged messages. The SA should
not learn any information from the communications be-
tween IoT devices and the procedures of performing
RSFs.
• Authenticity against malicious IoT devices: The iden-
tity of each IoT device should be verifiable by the
belonging SA. Before computing the specified SF for the
requesting IoT devices, SAs should authenticate the de-
vices first. This guarantees that unauthorized IoT devices
do not abuse the capability of computing SFs by SAs.
• Untraceability to IoT devices against honest-but-
curious SA: Every SA should not be able to trace the
identity of each IoT device in a communication session
launched by IoT devices even if the SA helps to compute
the SF of the session. This guarantees that footprints of
all communications are kept secret to SAs involved in the
computation.
By achieving the above three security requirements, SAs can
authenticate each IoT device before computing the specified
SF for them. The confidential messages of IoT devices cannot
be exposed to SAs. Moreover, the identity of devices and
communication sessions are unlinkable, so SAs cannot trace
the identity of any devices during all communication sessions
between IoT devices.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OF RESIOT
In this section, we first introduce the system architecture,
including the proposed SA, and the system interactions of
ReSIoT.
The system architecture of the ReSIoT, which consists of
IoT application servers, IoT security domains, GKMS, and
AAA system, is shown in Fig. 1. An IoT security domain
is formed by the devices, belonging to the same application.
4Each device equips with an unique identity associated with the
corresponding secret key for the AAA system. IoT application
servers support the required capabilities of computing and
storage resources, logic operations, and application data and
membership managements. Each security domain has one or
more dedicated service routers, which are interconnected with
IoT devices and can access to global communication networks,
such as mobile networks and the Internet.
The service routers are near-user edge IoT devices and
considered as SAs, which has sufficient resources to support
advanced security algorithms.4 For instance, a mobile device
(e.g., smartphone) equipping with high computation capability
and variant communication interfaces (e.g., UMTS or WLAN)
can work as a SA to serve the security of the other resource-
limited IoT devices in proximity. Either a user or the manager
of an application may deploy the selected SA in advance,
and each SA will inherit the security protection mechanism
of the underlying communication interface. By exploiting
the computing resources of SA, the computational costs of
resource-limited IoT devices can be greatly offloaded. The
deployment of SA brings the following advantages:
1) reduced complexity of key management for IoT devices;
2) no requirement of upgrading hardware capabilities of
IoT devices to fulfill advanced security mechanisms; and
3) high flexibility of adopting new security mechanisms.
A. Protocol Stack and System Interactions
Figure 2 shows the protocol stack of ReSIoT, which sup-
ports the provision of reconfigurable security for various
IoT security requirements. There are three main layers, con-
nectivity abstraction layer, security and resource layer, and
application layer.
The connectivity abstraction layer consists of network pro-
tocols (e.g., UDP/ID, Zigbee/bluetooth low energy (BLE), and
WLAN), session protection protocols (e.g., diagram trans-
port layer security (DTLS), and TLS), and message-oriented
Internet application protocols (e.g., constrained application
protocol (CoAP), data distribution service (DDS), extensible
messaging and presence protocol (XMPP), and message queue
telemetry transport (MQTT)). The security and resource layer
includes a resource manager, security functions, and secu-
rity agent. The resource manager maintains the capabilities
of computing, communication, and data of IoT devices as
resources. The security functions are supported by ReSIoT
and also considered as security resources. The security agent
is responsible for the functional supports of ReSIoT. The
application layer is composed of the applications as resources
for servers, clients, and service routers of IoT frameworks.
The RSF is a protocol, which can be realized as a cross-
layered middleware, installed on SAs and IoT devices, and it
runs on operating system or hardware according to the type
of devices. The implementation of RSFs depending on the
required operations performed by IoT devices and SA in a
complete execution procedure of RSF. Using the RSF, the SA
4The SA in the proposed framework is the kernel and different from the
SAs in IPSEC and the other related security protocols, which are located at
server side.
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Fig. 2. Protocol Stack of ReSIoT
can perform SFs compatibly to IoT devices with all kinds
of hardwares, applications, and communication standards. By
the application user interfaces (APIs) of RSFs, each device is
able to support the required security protections for various
IoT application requirements.
As an access request of RSF, sent by a specific application,
is received by the connectivity abstraction layer, the resource
manager will handle this request with the corresponding SF
and perform the RSF with the cooperation of IoT devices
and SAs. This enhances the flexibility of supporting various
RSFs for not only IoT applications but also communication
standards, where communication capabilities are also regarded
as resources in IoT frameworks.
IV. SECURITY PROTECTION BY RESIOT
This section explores how the ReSIoT exploits the advan-
tage of using near-user devices (i.e., SAs) to perform RSF
with IoT devices. First, we discuss how to simplify the key
management across multiple IoT applications by ReSIoT. We
then introduce the instantiations of two advanced security
protection mechanisms, i.e., anonymous authentication and
ABAC for data protection, by the construction of ReSIoT.
A. Key Management and Construction of RSF
As depicted in Fig. 1, each IoT domain deploys its own se-
curity keys for the subscriber IoT devices. As shown in Fig. 3,
in conventional IoT security, a device Di needs to maintain
a set of security keys keyDi = {KSSj1↔Di , ...,KSSjmi↔Di}
issued by the security servers of different IoT applications.
To reduce the complexity of key management, the IoT re-
configurable security adopts hierarchy-based key management.
Specifically, the SA of each security domain maintains a
credential for performing each RSFs with the corresponding
public/private key pair issued by GKMS.
Note that a GKMS is considered as the global key man-
agement system by trust authorities. The credentials issued by
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Fig. 3. The key management of IoT in the conventional and ReSIoT
architectures.
GKMS for certain RSFs, e.g., GS and ABE, should support
traceability and revocability [12], [13]. This offers additional
security protections in case of dispute or corruption of SAs.
The outputs of RSFs, e.g., signatures and ciphertexts, can be
traced to the originator SA. The capability of performing RSFs
can be suspended in case of the corruption of SAs.
Each IoT device or thing needs to maintain a secret shared,
i.e., KeyAAADi , with a global AAA system (e.g., home subscriber
server/authentication center (HSS/AuC) in mobile networks),
provided by network providers. With this secret, the authenti-
cated secure communication among IoT devices and SAs reply
on certain AAA-based authentication and key exchange (AKE)
protocol, such as EAP AKE protocol [5]. Each SA is assumed
to maintain a secure channel to the AAA system.
B. Construction of RSF
The construction of RSF consists of two parts: IoT device
attachment and conversion of SF into RSF. The attachment
procedure, which involves attached IoT device, SA, and AAA
system, is to establish mutual authentication among IoT device
and SA. One can realize this procedure by a certain AAA-
based authentication protocol, i.e., EAP authentication proto-
col [5], with the shared secret key among IoT devices and
AAA system as introduced in the previous section.
The conversion of SF into RSF involves IoT devices and
SAs only, where the SAs help to perform SF for IoT devices.
Besides the security requirements fulfilled by the specific SF,
the design of RSF needs to additionally consider the secu-
rity requirements, i.e., confidentiality against SA, authenticity
against malicious IoT device, and untraceability to IoT devices
against SA as introduced in Sec. II.
C. RSF of Group Signatures for Anonymous Authentication
By anonymous authentication, one can authenticate an entity
without knowing the exact identity, and for this, the iden-
tity of every authentication session should be randomized.
Group signatures can be utilized to practice anonymous au-
thentication by signing a given message as a signature of
the specific group using merely a group-based public-key
credential. Figure 4(a) shows how to convert a SF of group
signatures to its RSF for anonymous authentication between
two IoT devices Di and Dj . The SF consists of two functions
(F ,F−1) = (GSig,GV er), where GSig and GV er are the
group signing and verifying functions in group signatures,
respectively. GSig takes a group private key, ski, assigned
for each SAi and the signing message as inputs and outputs
a group signature, σi, which can be verified by GV er with
the group public key, pk, which outputs true or false as the
result of verifying σi.
Suppose that two devices attached to individual SAs, i.e.,
SAi and SAj , by an EAP-based authentication with the global
AAA system for the attachment. After the attachment, the
instantiation of RSF by group signature SF consists of the fol-
lowing procedure: 1) Di sends auth req = {DH X, Noncei}
to authenticate Dj , where DH X = gx is one of the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange tuple and Noncei is a random number,
2) Dj generates a shared key K = gxy by its Diffie-Hellman
tuple DH Y = gy and the received DH X, encrypts Noncei
as Ej = EK(Noncei) with a symmetric encryption, and sends
rand to SAj , 3) SAj generates a group signature σj on Ej with
skj and sends Ej to Dj , 4) Dj encrypts σj with the shared
key K as E ′j = EK(σj), and sends (DH Y, E ′j) to Di, 5) Di
decrypts E ′j to obtain σj with K computed by the received
DHY and sends σj to SAi for the verification of σj , and 6)
SAj verifies σj by performing F−1(pk, σj) and return true
or false as the result if the group signature from Dj is correct
or not. If so, the anonymous authentication is done among Di
and Dj by the RSF of group signatures.
D. RSF of Attribute-based Encryption for Attribute-based Ac-
cess Control
The ABAC allows a device to access protected things (e.g.,
multimedia content) or devices (e.g., sensors) with the ver-
ification of the attributes assigned to IoT devices and the
policy set for the protected target. The ABE provides secure
ABAC by encrypting messages with the public key of ABE
and a specified policy (i.e., a predicate of attributes). Only
the devices with legitimate secret keys associated with the
attributes, which satisfy the policy, can decrypt the encryption.
This implies the verification of attributes and policies is
achieved via the attribute-based encryption and decryption of
ABE. Here, we want to build a RSF of ABE by the SF of
ABE to practice the fine-grained access control in IoT. The
SF consists of two functions, (G,G−1) = (ABEnc,ABDec),
where ABEnc and ABDec are the encryption and decryption
functions of ABE.
Figure 4(b) depicts how to convert a ABE SF to the its
RSF for secure ABAC among two IoT devices with SAs. The
construction follows the procedures below: 1) In the beginning,
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Fig. 4. The constructions of RSF for anonymous authentication and data
access control by group signatures and attribute-based encryption, respectively.
both Di and Dj perform the attachment procedures, which
are the same as that in the RSF of group signatures, and
exchange a shared key K by Diffie-Hellman key exchange;
2) Di encrypts its data and acknowledgement ack with K as
Ei = EK(data||ack), and sends Ei and the ABAC policy to
SAi; 3) SAi encrypts Ei by G with the public key pk and
policy as E ′i and sends back to Di; 4) Di encrypts E ′i with K
as E ′′i = EK(E ′i) and sends E ′i to Dj ; 5) Dj decrypts E ′′i to
obtain E ′i and forwards to SAj ; 6) SAj decrypts E ′i by G−1
with its private key skj to obtain E ′i and sends it back to Dj ,
and 7) Dj decrypts E ′i to obtain data and ack, and sends ack
to confirm the correctness of the decryption. If the attributes
of skj satisfy policy, Dj will obtain the exact same data and
ack shared with Di.
E. Security Analysis
We discuss how the two proposed RSFs can fulfill the
three additional security requirements, presented in Sec. II, as
follows. First, since a session key is shared by Diffie-Hellman
key agreement in every RSF session, the SA can only compute
encrypted messages and learn no messages exchanged between
two IoT devices from computing specified SF for IoT devices.
This guarantees the confidentiality against honest-but-curious
SAs. Second, IoT devices fulfill the authenticity of every
IoT device attaching to the SA in its proximity. Finally, the
communication sessions, launched by the same IoT device will
not be traceable when anonymous authentication is adopted in
the IoT device attachment procedure. Hence, the computing
of SFs on SAs will not break the security of communications
among IoT devices.
V. PERFORMANCE OF RESIOT
This section evaluates the communication and computation
costs of two RSFs, described in Fig. 4. The advanced crypto-
graphic algorithms are used such as Boneh-Boyen-Shacham
group signatures (BBS GS) [14] and Goyal-Sahai-Pandey-
Waters attribute-based encryption (GSPW ABE) [7] for anony-
mous authentication and ABAC. The SA is commonly consid-
ered as a relatively powerful device among IoT devices. Hence,
we take a desktop computer (Apple Macbook Air 2012 model
equipped with Intel Core i5 (dual-core) 1.8 GHz CPU and
4 GB RAM) as a SA and a smart phone (ASUS Zenfone
2 ZE551ML equipped with Quad-core 1.8 GHz CPU and 2
GB RAM model) as IoT devices to observe the performance
enhancement with the ReSIoT in the experiments.5
A. Comparison of Computational Cost for Cryptographic Al-
gorithms
Before comparing the performance of reconfigurable se-
curity with legacy security solutions, we first analyze the
computational costs of two cryptographic algorithms, BBS GS
and GSPW ABE on the testbed platforms, respectively. The
algorithms employ the bilinear pairing operation [15], which
is an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) arithmetic operation
and needs considerable computational cost to execute the
algorithms. In Table I, we present the computational time of
the bilinear pairing related operations, including multiplica-
tion (Mul), exponentiation (Power), and pairing in the same
bilinear pairing groups on both platforms by Java Pairing-
based Cryptography (JPBC) library. Using those computa-
tional times, we can obtain the computational times of two
SFs on SA and IoT device, respectively.
B. Processing Time
We compare the performance of RSFs with the legacy
solutions for two security requirements, i.e., anonymous au-
thentication and ABAC. Here, the legacy solutions mean the
ones simply perform SFs (i.e., BBS GS and GSPW ABE)
on IoT devices for the aforementioned security requirements.
First, the processing time for completing RSF with IoT devices
and SA can be denoted as TRSF = tDattach+ t
D
RSF + t
SA
RSF (≈
tSASF ) + t
D
COM + t
D−SA
COM , where t
D
attach is the attachment time
of IoT devices to SAs, tDRSF is the computation time of IoT
devices for RSF, tSARSF is the computation time of RSF on
SAs and it is basically equal to the computation time of
SF on SAs, tSASF , t
D
COM is the communication time between
IoT devices, and tD−SACOM is the communication time between
IoT devices and SAs. Since each device only needs to attach
the SA in its communication coverage at the beginning, we
therefore eliminate the time of attachment to SA in evaluating
TRSF . We denote the processing time of completing SF with
merely IoT devices as TSF = tDSF + t
D
COM , where t
D
SF is the
computation time of SF on IoT device. We estimate tDCOM
by observing the communication of WiFi direct, which is
one of wireless communication standards for device-to-device
communications and tD−SACOM by observing the communication
between smartphone and a PC server via wireless AP. In the
experiment, tDCOM is 56 ms and t
D−SA
COM is 243 ms in average
by transmitting 1024-bit string for 1000 times.
5These devices have been adopted with the expectation of the computing
capability evolution, which will be made at even small IoT devices in the
future.
7TABLE I
COMPUTATION COSTS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS
Pairing,
Tp (G1×G2→GT )
Power,
TG1exp (G1)
Mul,
TG1mul (G1)
Power,
TG2exp (G2)
Mul,
TG2mul (G2)
Power,
T
GT
exp (GT )
Mul,
T
GT
mul (GT )
IoT device (Smart phone) 271.0 ms 122.7 ms 123.2 121.8 ms 115.3 ms 40.8 ms 39.5 ms
Security agent (PC) 14.8 ms 13.6 ms 12.8 ms 12.6 ms 12.6 1.1 ms 1.1 ms
BBS Group Signature(1)
GSPW Attribute-based Encryption
(for 50 attributes)(2)
Signing Verifying Encrypt Decrypt
Computation time at IoT
device for SF, tDSF
2409.3 ms 1786.8 ms 6380.9 ms 1863.0 ms
Computation time at SA
for SF, tSASF
208.5 ms 224.7 ms 706.4 ms 95.4 ms
Processing time of
conventional SF, TSF
2465.3 ms 1842.8 ms 6436.9 ms 1919 ms
Processing time of RSF,
TRSF
509.837 ms 526.037 ms 1067.737 ms 396.737 ms
Reduced Processing Time
by RSF
79.32% 71.46% 83.42% 79.33%
(1) Computation time of BBS Group Signature: (Signing) 9TG1exp+3T
G1
mul+3T
GT
exp +3Tp, (Verifying) 8T
G1
exp + 4T
G1
mul + 5T
G1
exp + 4Tp
(2) Computation time of Attribute-based Encryption: (Encrypt) (Na + 1)T
G1
exp + T
G1
mul for Na number of attributes, (Decrypt)
dlogNae(Tp + TGTmul)
- tDSF and t
SA
SF are the computation times of the SF with respect to the specified cryptographic algorithm on smart phone and PC,
respectively.
- tDRSF = t
D
DH + t
D
Enc is the computation time required for RSF on smart phone, where t
D
DH = 2.31 ms is the computation time of
Diffie-Hellman key agreement with key size of 1024-bit and tDEnc = 0.027 ms is the computation time of AES encrytion/decryption
with input of 160-bit on smart phone.
The computation and communication time of the signing
and verification of BBS GS and the encryption and decryption
of GSPW ABE are summarized in Table I. From Table I,
we can see that the processing time has been reduced by
from 83.42% to 71.46% by the RSF. This result shows even
though the RSFs require additional communications among
IoT devices and SAs, the processing times of RSFs remain
to outperform those of the conventional SFs thanks to the
significant amount of high complexity computations being
offloaded to SAs.
We then can estimate the rate of completing functions
required by a security request within the request expiration
time, which we call it as the success rate of security requests.
Here, we consider the load at the SA as well. A SA may
serve multiple devices at once, and the SA will reserve its
resource (e.g., CPU and required memory for processing) for
each incoming security request issued by devices or things to
serve in a first-come-first-serve (FCFS) manner. The incoming
request needs to wait in a queue to be processed when the
SA is busy for other requests. The security request will
fail whenever the device or thing issuing request loses the
connection to the SA or the session time of the request is
expired before completing the process for the security request.
Hence, the expected processing time of each security service
can be determined by averaging out the processing time tSARSF
when tSARSF ≤ texp, where texp is the expiration time of a
request, tSARSF = t
SA
Q + t
SA
SF , and t
SA
Q is the waiting time in
queue for a request.
Figure 5 shows the total processing time and the success rate
of security requires according to the arrival rate of security
requests for different values of expiration time of security
Fig. 5. This figure evaluates the system processing time and success rate of
security requests with different arrival rate of security requests and different
request expiration time.
request texp. In this figure, ck(= λktSASF ) is the scaled arrival
rate of security requests (i.e., the arrival rate in tSASF ), and
c2(= t
SA
RSF/t
SA
SF ) is scaled total processing time of RSF. Here,
we use a fixed value, 208.5 ms, for tSASF (the computational
time of a signing operation of BBS group signature) and
increase λk up to λk = 1/tSASF (i.e., ck = 1) to keep a steady
state of queue in the simulation. From Fig. 5, we can first see
that even for ck = 1, the success rate is greater than 80%. For
the arrival rate less than 0.7tSAk (i.e., ck < 0.7), the success
rate is higher than 90% for all cases of request expiration time.
8VI. SUMMARY
In this article, after overviewing issues and existing solu-
tions of IoT security, we introduce a reconfigurable security
framework based on edge computing, which utilizes a near-
user edge devices, i.e., a SA, with stronger computation
capability for IoT security. Based on the framework, one can
design a reconfigurable security function protocol, interacting
with SA, to resolve any specific security requirements. We
also provide two exemplary reconfigurable security function
protocols for anonymous authentication and secure attribute-
based access control. Through the performance analysis, it is
shown that reconfigurable security function protocols outper-
form legacy solutions even though additional communications
required to interact with SA. The reconfigurable security
can provide security protections for IoT devices with better
flexibility and scalability in hardwares (e.g., computational ca-
pability and memory) and softwares (e.g., various of standards
and the complexity of key management due to comprehensive
application scenarios).
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